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Public policies may affect employment by directly creating jobs, facilitating job creation, or 
augmenting labor supply. In labor markets with high unemployment, such employment changes 
may have significant net efficiency benefits, which should be included in benefit-cost analyses.  
 
The research literature offers diverse recommendations on measuring employment benefits. 
Many of the recommendations rely on arbitrary assumptions. The resulting employment benefit 
estimates vary widely. 
 
This paper reviews this literature, and offers recommendations on how to better measure 
employment benefits using estimable parameters. Guidance is provided on measuring policy-
induced labor demand, estimating the demand shock’s impact on labor market outcomes, and 
translating labor market impacts into efficiency benefits. Two measures are proposed for 
efficiency benefits, one relying on adjusted reservation wage gains, the other on adjusted 
earnings gains.   
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Introduction 
  What dollar value should a benefit cost analysis place on jobs?  This paper considers this 
issue for diverse policies affecting employment. Public policies may directly create jobs by 
hiring workers, such as workers to build levees.  Does such hiring benefit workers, offsetting 
some project labor costs? 
  Public policies may spur private job creation.  For example, economic development 
programs, such as business tax incentives, aim at expanding a local area’s jobs. Dams may create 
lakes that increase tourism jobs.  Are there efficiency benefits from such job creation? 
  Public policies may spur higher employment for targeted individuals, such as the 
disadvantaged.  For example, job training programs, by increasing job skills of disadvantaged 
individuals, seek to increase their wages and work hours.  The resulting increase in earnings is a 
benefit.  Should this benefit be partially offset because of reduced leisure time?   
  If labor markets cleared, with no involuntary unemployment and no other distortions, 
these questions have simple answers.  Wages equal the marginal product of labor and the 
opportunity cost of the marginal worker’s time.  Efficiency effects of additional employment can 
be easily measured.  A levee, dam, or incentive that adds to labor demand will obtain this labor 
by slightly increasing the wage, which will bid workers away from other work and nonwork 
activities.  The value of the foregone time at other work is the marginal product of labor, equal to 
the market wage.  The value of foregone time at nonwork activities is the worker’s subjective 
value of this time, also equal to the market wage.  The cost of project labor is the market wage.  
At the old wage, workers do not gain from additional employment.  Workers’ gains from 
increased wages are offset by costs to employers.  The efficiency benefit in the labor market of 
additional employment is nil.   
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  Without involuntary unemployment, each worker works as much as she wishes at her 
market wage.  A job training program may raise a trainee’s skills and wages.  The wage increase 
benefits the trainee.  A work hour increase due to increased wages also is a benefit, as the worker 
chose to work more.  But the gross increase in earnings due to increased work hours is not the 
net benefit, as these increased work hours reduce worker leisure.  The worker’s value of leisure 
must have been at least equal to the previous wage; otherwise, the worker would have already 
worked the added hours.  Suppose training raises wages by 25 percent. Then at least four-fifths 
(100 percent divided by 125 percent) of the earnings increase from extra work hours would be 
offset by foregone leisure costs.   
  An increased labor supply due to job training may displace other workers from jobs.  If 
labor markets always clear, such displacement has no efficiency costs.  The training-induced 
boost to skilled labor supply may decrease wages for that skill.  The decreased wages will 
increase labor demanded and reduce labor supplied by the original labor suppliers.  These 
demand and supply changes allow the skilled trainees to be fully employed.  But at the old wage, 
the changes in quantities of labor demanded and supplied do not benefit either employers or the 
original workers.  The wage decrease redistributes from workers to employers, with no net 
efficiency effects. 
  This same argument applies to spillover effects on other labor markets.  Policies may 
indirectly affect labor demanded and supplied in other labor markets than the labor market first 
affected by the policy.  For example, the local tourism induced by a dam may reduce tourism 
elsewhere.  Reduced tourism elsewhere will reduce employment and wages in this other labor 
market.  But if labor markets clear, such spillover effects are distributional effects that net out, 
with zero efficiency effects.  
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  Involuntary unemployment makes benefit-cost analysis more difficult.  First, involuntary 
unemployment makes it harder to see how policies will change wages, unemployment, and the 
employment of various groups.  When labor markets clear, these changes depend only on how 
labor demand and supply respond to wages.  But when labor markets don’t clear, economists 
don’t agree on how wages, employment, and unemployment are set.  Furthermore, it is harder to 
see who is employed among the excess labor supply.   
  Second, with involuntary unemployment, although the market wage is still equal to the 
marginal product of labor, the value that unemployed workers place on their time may be well 
below the market wage.  Furthermore, this value of the unemployed’s time is harder to measure 
because it is not immediately observable.  Even if one knew each unemployed worker’s value of 
time, it is harder to determine who will be employed.  As a result, when a policy increases 
employment of an individual or group, this change has large benefits equal to the gap between 
the market wage and the value of that individual or group’s time, and those large benefits are 
harder to measure.  
  Third, spillover effects on labor markets with involuntary unemployment may not have 
zero efficiency benefits.  For example, if such spillovers increase employment, the marginal 
product of increased employment may exceed the lower value of time of the unemployed who 
gain jobs.  This represents an efficiency benefit.  Spillovers are common.  A policy may have 
indirect effects on other labor markets through multiplier effects and other macroeconomic 
effects, external benefits such as agglomeration economies, or general equilibrium effects.  
Measuring efficiency benefits of all spillovers is difficult.    
  Dealing with these issues requires assumptions about the labor market and about hard-to-
observe parameters.  As I will discuss, different researchers have adopted different models and  
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assumptions, which give different answers.  The literature on jobs in benefit-cost analysis is not a 
unified literature with researchers in fruitful dialogue.  Researchers use assumptions that fit the 
problem at hand and their particular philosophies.  Most researchers share the intuition that the 
efficiency benefits of increased employment are higher when involuntary unemployment is high, 
but some get that result in different ways and with different benefit estimates.  In this paper, I 
advance the dialogue by identifying key parameters that determine the efficiency benefits of 
policy-induced employment changes. 
  This paper does not address how the benefit-cost analysis of policy-induced employment 
changes is affected by taxes or benefits, e.g., payroll taxes or unemployment benefits.  Such 
fiscal effects are better considered as part of a broader analysis of a policy’s fiscal impacts.  
Fiscal impact analysis is simpler, because this addition to benefits is based on observable fiscal 
variables.  Modifying benefit-cost analysis to take account of unemployment involves harder-to-
measure parameters.   
 
Textbook and Other Approaches to Including Jobs in Benefit-Cost Analysis 
The most popular textbook approach to including jobs in benefit-cost analysis is shown in 
Boardman et al. (2011), Haveman and Farrow (2011), and Greenberg and Robins (2008).  
Consider a policy that adds to labor demand, either by direct hiring or development effects.  
Some portion of this demand increase will reduce involuntary unemployment.  The reduced 
unemployment has benefits equal to the wages paid minus the unemployed’s reservation wages, 
which reflect the value of time in leisure or job search.  
  Labor suppliers’ reservation wages are reflected in the labor supply curve.  The 
reservation wage of the newly employed depends upon their location on the supply curve.  If the  
5 
newly employed are randomly chosen from the available labor supply, their reservation wage 
will be the average reservation wage of the available labor supply.  In that case, benefits from 
reducing unemployment will not vary with the unemployment rate. 
  With assumptions about labor supply, this average reservation wage of the available labor 
supply can be measured.  Suppose the labor supply curve is linear and passes through  the current 
market wage and labor supply, and through the origin point where both the wage and labor 
supply are equal to zero.  Then the reservation wage will be one-half the market wage, regardless 
of unemployment.  Other labor supply curves yield different values for average reservation 
wages.  For example, based on Greenberg (1997), average reservation wages range from 0  to 88 
percent of market wages. (Earnings gains would be multiplied by percentages in Greenberg’s 
Tables 1 and 2 with initial hours of zero.)  If the elasticity of labor supply at the market wage is 
0.1, the minimum reservation wage is half the market wage, and labor supply curves are 
elliptical, then reservation wages will average 61 percent of market wages. 
  But jobs may not be randomly assigned.  Jobs may differentially go to labor suppliers 
with lower reservation wages.  Because such labor suppliers benefit more from work, they may 
search more vigorously for jobs and have lower quit rates (Bartik 1991, Appendix 8.1).  If so, the 
reservation wage of the newly employed will be lower, and employment benefits higher, if initial 
unemployment rates are higher.  
If jobs are perfectly assigned to those with the lowest reservation wages, we can estimate 
the reservation wages of the newly employed if we know the labor supply curve.  Suppose the 
labor supply curve is linear, and passes through zero wages and zero labor supply.  Then if the 
involuntary unemployment rate is x percent, the reservation wage of the newly employed will be 
x percent below the market wage.  If labor supply is less elastic, reservation wages will vary  
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more with unemployment.  Assume the following:  unemployment in excess of 3 percent is 
involuntary unemployment; the elasticity of labor force participation with respect to the 
unemployment rate is −0.5, as implied by both Okun’s Law (Gordon 2010) and empirical 
estimates (Bowen and Finegan 1969); the elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages is 0.15 
(Fuchs et al. 1998).  Then at an unemployment rate of 4.6 percent, the 2007 U.S. average, the 
reservation wage of the newly employed is 15 percent below the market wage.  When 
unemployment is 9.6 percent, as it was in 2010, the reservation wage of the newly employed is 
48 percent below the market wage.  (The ratio of the reservation wage to the market wage will be 
exp [(UR − 0.03) (1 + 0.5) (−1) / 0.15].)  
The real world may involve some mix of jobs being randomly allocated versus allocated 
to those with lower reservation wages.  In this in-between case, the reservation wage of the 
newly employed will be lower than when jobs are always assigned to those with the lower 
reservation wages.  However, reservation wages will vary less with unemployment.   
To estimate employment benefits, we must also know what percentage of the increased 
employment comes from involuntary unemployment, versus displaced other employment, or 
more voluntary unemployment.  The literature’s assumptions are ad hoc.  The Boardman et al. 
text argues that if unemployment is “very high (say, over 10 or 15 percent)” all the jobs may 
reduce involuntary unemployment, whereas if unemployment is “low (say, below 5 percent),” 
the workers come from persons who are “between jobs rather than in surplus” (Boardman et al. 
p. 105).  The Mishan and Quah (2007) textbook on benefit-cost analysis argues that “the greater 
the degree of unemployment in the economy, the larger the likelihood that the worker will be 
drawn from the unemployment pool” (pp. 72–73).  Mishan and Quah reference the pioneering 
work of Haveman and Krutilla (1967).  Haveman and Krutilla assumed that none of the newly  
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employed would come from the involuntary unemployed when the economy was at full 
employment, which was assumed to be 1953’s unemployment rate of 2.9 percent.  They assumed 
that all of the newly employed would come from the involuntarily unemployed in a Great 
Depression, assumed to be 25 percent unemployment.  In between these extremes, Haveman and 
Krutilla assumed that the probability of the newly employed coming from the involuntarily 
unemployed varied with the unemployment rate either linearly or logarithmically.  At 4.6 percent 
unemployment (the year 2007), the linear assumption means that the probability of drawing from 
the unemployment pool would be 8 percent, whereas the logarithmic assumption means that this 
probability would be 32 percent.  At 9.6 percent unemployment (the year 2010), the linear 
assumption means that the probability of drawing from the unemployment pool would be 30 
percent, whereas the logarithmic assumption means that this probability would be 65 percent.    
Another issue is translating direct project effects into overall effects on employment. 
Haveman and Krutilla (1967) still provide the most detailed approach to translating a project’s 
direct labor demands into occupational demands.  Their model uses an input-output model for 
the project’s direct industry output demands to derive overall demands by industry.  However, 
this input-output table omits effects from household respending.  The implicit assumption is that 
household respending might be negated by the project’s tax financing.  The industry outputs are 
then translated into occupational demands using an industry-occupation matrix.  
Mishan and Quah’s (2007) text discusses benefits under Keynesian unemployment. If a 
project is financed not by taxes, but by borrowing from idle bank balances or by money creation, 
then the project may produce Keynesian multiplier effects on employment.  In this case, the total 
earnings increase may be many times the project’s payroll.       
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Greenberg (1997) and Greenberg and Robins (2008) analyze employment benefits of 
programs that encourage work for the disadvantaged.  The disadvantaged might be encouraged to 
work by job training, job search assistance, welfare-to-work programs, or wage subsidies.  The 
benefits for that individual worker include the increase in earnings due to wage increases for the 
individual’s original work hours and the increased earnings on additional hours worked minus 
the average reservation wage for the added hours.  The reservation wage can be estimated if we 
know the worker’s labor supply curve.  For example, suppose we assume the following: the 
worker did not work before the policy, the worker requires a reservation wage of half the market 
wage to work at all, the worker’s post-training work hours are chosen by the worker given her 
post-training wage, the elasticity of the worker’s labor supply at the post-policy wage and work 
hours is 0.1, and the labor supply curve is elliptical.  Based on those assumptions, the reservation 
wage for the added work hours is 61 percent of the increase in earnings due to increased work 
hours.  
The Greenberg (1997) and Greenberg & Robins (2007) papers recognize that their 
analysis does not measure spillover effects on others of jobs programs for the disadvantaged.  
Spillover effects may yield efficiency effects if there is involuntary unemployment.  Therefore, 
these estimates of the employment benefits of programs for the disadvantaged are more complete 
if we assume that we are close to full employment.       
  Not all researchers analyze employment benefits as the wages paid minus reservation 
wages.  Mishan and Quah (2007) follow an older tradition in which the opportunity cost of the 
unemployed’s time is the value of leisure.  This value is adjusted down due to stigma effects of 
unemployment, perhaps “so much so that [the unemployed worker] is prepared to pay to be 
employed even where no wage at all is offered to him” (p. 69).  The original Haveman and  
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Krutilla (1967) article also assumed that “involuntary leisure has a zero benefit” (p. 389).  
Haveman and Farrow (2011) also mention that “leisure time involuntarily imposed” may yield 
“negative utility” (p. 3).  
  Additional employment for the involuntarily unemployed may also have “empathy-
based” spillover benefits for others.  As Mishan and Quah (2007) note, we must consider the 
effects of a person gaining employment on “his friends (or enemies) and members of his family” 
(p. 70). 
It makes a big difference whether the value of the unemployed’s time is measured by the 
reservation wage, or by the value of leisure adjusted down due to stigma and empathy spillover 
effects.  If we use the reservation wage to measure opportunity costs, employment benefits of 
public policies would be low.  Reservation wages from interviews are typically close to market 
wages.  Average ratios of the unemployed’s stated reservation wages to previous market wages 
are 105 percent (Jones 1989), 107 percent (Feldstein and Poterba 1984), and 99 percent (Krueger 
and Mueller 2011).  Ratios are high even when overall unemployment rates are high (14 percent 
unemployment in Jones [1989]; 10 percent in Krueger & Mueller [2011]).  Ratios are high even 
for job losers, the long-term unemployed, or welfare recipients (Grogger 2009).  
One could argue that reservation wages from surveys are exaggerated.  Up to 44 percent 
of all job offers below the stated reservation wage are accepted (Krueger and Mueller 2011).  
However, Krueger and Mueller (2011) find that whether the offered wage was more than the 
stated reservation wage did significantly affect whether a job offer was accepted, and did so 
much better than using the worker’s previous wage or wages above or below the stated 
reservation wage.   
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Reservation wages estimated from market wages are also close to market wages:  91 
percent of the market wage for the unemployed in Mohanty (2005, Table 2, part (b), 1993 
sample), and 80 percent of the market wage of the employed in Hofler and Murphy (1994).  
Therefore, using reservation wages, employment benefits are small compared to the 
wages of the newly employed.  Employment benefits will loom large relative to the project’s 
budget only if the project has high input-output or multiplier effects on overall employment.  
In contrast, when the unemployed’s time is valued as the value of leisure, adjusted for 
stigma costs and empathy-based spillovers, the benefits from increased employment are much 
greater.  Studies of “overall life satisfaction” or “happiness” show strong negative effects of 
unemployment (Helliwell and Huang 2011; Blanchflower and Oswald 2004).  These negative 
effects of unemployment are in addition to the negative effects of unemployment on life 
satisfaction via reduced income. 
By comparing unemployment’s effects on life satisfaction with the effects of income on 
life satisfaction, we can compute the implicit dollar equivalent of the loss due to 
unemployment’s non-pecuniary effects.  The negative non-pecuniary effects appear to be at least 
equal to the reduction in income due to unemployment (Helliwell and Huang 2011).  
Perhaps surveys of life satisfaction don’t mean much because those surveyed don’t treat 
the questions seriously or don’t know how to respond.  We find much smaller effects of 
unemployment on average positive or negative emotions during the preceding day (Knabe et al. 
2009).  However, measures of emotional well-being are also far less sensitive to income 
(Kahneman and Deaton 2010; Knabe et al. 2009), which is inconsistent with how economists 
approach human behavior.  Furthermore, it seems strange to totally discount what people say 
about life satisfaction.  Finally, the negative effects of unemployment on life satisfaction are  
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consistent with much research showing that unemployment damages physical and mental health 
(Frey and Stutzer 2002).  Many labor economics studies show that involuntary displacement 
from jobs has large long-run negative effects on earnings.  For example, Davis and Wachter 
(2011) find that involuntary displacement from jobs lowers the present value of future earnings 
for some men by 11 percent.  
The life satisfaction studies also show negative effects of local or national unemployment 
rates on life satisfaction that aggregate up to large dollar values, relative to the labor income 
effects of unemployment (Helliwell and Huang 2011; Tella et al. 2001).  Empathy-based 
spillover effects of unemployment are smaller per person affected than unemployment’s direct 
effects on the unemployed.  But the total value of these spillover effects is large when added over 
the population.  The total dollar value of the increase in life satisfaction from a reduced 
unemployment rate is 6 times (Tella et al. 2001) to 10 times (Helliwell and Huang 2011) greater 
than the total dollar value of the increase in life satisfaction for the newly employed.  
Therefore, the opportunity cost of the reduced leisure of the newly employed could be 
close to zero or even negative, after we adjust for stigma and empathy-based spillover effects.  
This greatly increases the efficiency benefits of policy-induced increases in labor demand.  
For policies that enhance the employment of the disadvantaged, empathy-based spillover 
benefits on nonparticipants may be more important (Greenberg and Robins 2008).  If individual 
nonparticipants place even a small per capita dollar value on increased employment of 
participants, the aggregate value of such spillover effects can dominate the benefit-cost analysis 
of these programs.  Including nonparticipants’ valuation of participant employment can be 
viewed negatively, as paternalism (Greenberg 1997).  But nonparticipant valuation may also take 
the form of caring and social solidarity.   
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Another approach to measuring the opportunity cost of labor is taken by Harberger 
(1971).  (A similar model was developed by Harris and Todaro [1970].)  The Harberger and 
Harris/Todaro models develop a general equilibrium view of opportunity cost. What is important 
is not who is immediately hired by the project, but the ultimate source of project labor.  
In Harberger’s paper, he considers an extreme case: involuntary unemployment in the 
urban sector, a market-clearing wage in a large rural sector, and perfect mobility between the two 
sectors.  Suppose that in migrating between the rural and urban sectors, workers maximize 
income adjusted for the risk of unemployment.  For example, if the urban wage is $15, urban 
unemployment is 33.3 percent, and the rural wage is $10, then this will be a zero net-migration 
equilibrium because the urban wage times the employment rate equals the rural wage.  Suppose a 
policy raises urban labor demand.  Assume the urban wage is fixed, and the rural sector is large 
enough that its wage is unaffected by increased urban labor demand and any migration.  Then in 
the new equilibrium, for every 2 workers added to urban labor demand, 3 rural workers migrate 
to the urban sector.  This maintains the equilibrium unemployment rate and forestalls further 
migration.  The foregone product from these 3 rural workers is 3 ×$10.  Therefore, the average 
opportunity cost of these 2 new urban workers is (3 ×$10) / 2 workers, which equals $15, just 
equal to the urban wage.  There are no employment benefits from the project’s hiring to offset 
project labor costs.  
This finding is counterintuitive, as urban workers are willing to work for less than the 
urban wage.  But this is true if these workers are already in the urban sector.  The “reservation 
wage” to attract an additional worker to urban employment is equal to the urban wage, as this 
urban wage is needed to attract rural workers given the risk of unemployment.    
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This specific result depends on perfect mobility.  However, the broader point that we 
should consider general equilibrium effects is sound.  
To sum up, the literature on including jobs in benefit-cost analysis does not offer a 
cohesive approach.  Rather, a variety of approaches leads to employment benefits that range 
from zero percent to some multiples of 100 percent of the policy’s direct employment effects.  
Another recent review also finds wide variation across studies in employment benefits, with 
ratios of social costs of labor to market wages of 5 percent to 173 percent (Bo et al. 2009, Table 
2).  
 
A Critique of the Textbook Approach 
  The textbook approach to employment benefits, which uses reservation wages, has some 
problems.  The benefit for the hired individual from added employment is only a part of overall 
efficiency benefits.  In principle, we can measure each individual’s benefits using reservation 
wages, and then aggregate to get efficiency benefits.  In practice, this is hard to do.   
  The textbook approach does not place enough emphasis on wage gains from occupational 
upgrading as part of employment benefits.  New jobs create a chain of job opportunities. Job 
chains are mentioned in the literature (Harberger 1971; Boardman et al. 2011).  However, the 
empirical importance of wage gains from job chains is not emphasized, nor is any guide given 
for estimating these wage gains. 
  When a new job is created in a local or national labor market, ultimately that job must 
lead to employment of someone who is not now employed in that labor market.  That additional 
employment can come from the unemployed, those out of the labor force, in-migrants to the 
labor market, or “averted out-migrants” who otherwise would have lived elsewhere.  
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  However, before the new job leads to additional employment, it will typically lead to a 
job chain of upgrading opportunities for the currently employed.  A new job may be filled by 
someone already employed.  This “job switcher” must have gained from this voluntary move.  
The job switcher’s old job is now vacant.  That job vacancy may be filled by someone already 
employed, who also will upgrade his or her job.  Ultimately the chain is broken by the hiring of 
someone not employed in that labor market.  But before that happens, there are wage gains.   
  The importance of job chains is explored by Persky et al. (2004).  The average new job 
results in 2.5 job vacancies.  This implies 1 person moving to employment and 1.5 moving to a 
better job.  The resulting wage upgrading is about 15 percent of the wages of the new job.  
(Author’s calculations based on the Persky et al. [2004] job chain matrices, for a job that 
averages their five job types.  The averages are based on translating their job types into the 2006 
U.S. wage distribution used in Bartik and Houseman [2008].)   
  These Persky et al. (2004) estimates are consistent with the occupational upgrading 
effects found in Bartik (1991, p. 150).  A 1 percent labor demand shock to a metropolitan area’s 
employment is estimated to move individuals up to occupations whose national wages are 0.24 
percent higher.  This implies that a new job leads to occupational upgrading of 24 percent of the 
new job’s wages (0.24 = (dW/W) / (dE/E) = (EdW)/(WdE), where W is wages, dW is wage 
change, E is employment, dE is employment change).  Occupational upgrading was the only 
significant real wage effect of local labor demand shocks.  
  Another perspective is that the efficiency benefit from job creation is the earnings 
created, minus the opportunity cost of the person who ultimately gains employment.  Even if this 
opportunity cost is close to the wage of the newly employed, it could be far below the new job’s 
wage.   
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  Consider a new job at $15 per hour. Suppose it is filled by someone now employed at 
$12.  That job vacancy is filled by someone employed at $10.  Finally, the $10 job is filled by 
someone who was unemployed.  Suppose the opportunity cost of that unemployed person’s time 
is zero.  
  Then we can calculate market-wide worker benefits in two ways.  We can add up the 
wage gains plus the gain for the newly employed.  Or we can compare the new job’s wage with 
the opportunity cost of the newly employed worker’s time.  The former approach says the gain is 
$3 plus $2 plus $10 = $15.  The latter approach says the gain is $15.  
  An efficiency analysis must also consider whether occupational upgrading is offset by 
losses to employers.  Does the worker’s productivity gain match the wage gain from the 
upgrading?  Assume the worker’s productivity at the worker’s old occupation was typical of that 
occupation.  Will the worker’s productivity at the new occupation also be typical?  If the 
worker’s productivity at the new occupation is below standard, employers suffer a loss.  
Productivity offsets are probably larger if unemployment is low.  If unemployment is 
initially high, an increase in labor demand often allows workers to move up to occupations they 
previously held.  Meeting the upgraded job’s standards seems likely.  But if unemployment is 
low, an increase in labor demand will lead to workers being promoted further beyond their 
previous job experience or job qualifications.   
In addition, the individual gain for an unemployed worker who is hired, measured by 
their actual wage minus their reservation wage, will not reflect overall efficiency gains from that 
hiring.  The unemployed worker’s reservation wage reflects his or her probability of being hired 
in the future for various jobs and wages (Mortensen 1986; Shimer and Werning 2007).  The 
acceptance of this new job means that those future job prospects are more available to other  
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workers.  This greater availability benefits these other workers.  The initial gain for the newly 
employed understates the market-wide worker benefits.  
  Consider a new job at $15 per hour.  All jobs last for a single time period, and we are 
seeking to measure employment benefits for that period.  The $15 per hour job is assumed to be 
filled by person A who was unemployed.  Suppose that person A’s reservation wage was $12 
because they knew that just before the time period started, they would have been hired for a job 
paying $12.  Then the gain for person A is only $3 per hour. But because person A did not take 
that $12 job, it is available for person B.  Suppose person B is also unemployed.  Person B’s 
reservation wage is $10 because B would have shortly been hired at that wage.  Person B’s gain 
is $2.  Now the $10 job is open to person C.  Assume person C would have been unemployed 
throughout that time period.  Then person C’s reservation wage during the period is person C’s 
value of leisure, adjusted for stigma effects.  Suppose this net value is zero. Person C’s gain is 
$10.  Total worker gains at $15 significantly exceed the gains for person A, the unemployed 
person who is directly hired for the new job. 
  The practical problem for the reservation wage approach is measurement. How are we 
going to measure all the benefits that ripple through the labor market from the hiring of one 
unemployed worker?  These ripples include changes in future probabilities of various jobs for 
various workers.   
Note that current reservation wages will not determine the labor supply curve.  For 
example, in a market-clearing labor market, the reservation wage for all workers is the current 
market wage.  Why would any worker accept a job for less?  But this doesn’t mean that if market 
wages decline, all current workers will drop out of the labor market.  Reservation wages depend  
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upon current market opportunities.  Current reservation wages do not reveal the labor supply 
response to changed opportunities, and vice versa.   
We need employment benefit concepts that are easier to measure.  I consider possible 
approaches next.  
 
Feasible Approaches to Measuring Employment Benefits 
Two ways to measure employment benefits seem feasible.  The first is an adjusted 
reservation wage gain approach—gains in reservation wages for all workers and nonworkers, 
adjusted for employer losses.  The second way is an adjusted earnings gains approach—earnings 
gains minus the value of lost leisure, adjusted for stigma effects, empathy-based spillover 
benefits, and employer losses.   
The adjusted reservation wage gain measure is based on research showing that the 
reservation wage measures the value of worker access to the labor market (Shimer and Werning 
2007).  The reservation wage represents the lowest wage at which the worker is indifferent 
between working and continuing to search.  If the labor market improves, the resulting 
reservation wage increase is the worker’s willingness to pay for access to the improved labor 
market.  Reservation wage increases summed over the employed and not-employed equal the 
overall increase in worker well-being.  Subtracting employer losses results in overall efficiency 
benefits of the demand shock.   
Consider the previous example.  A new job at $15 went to unemployed person A with a 
$12 reservation wage.  This led to a $12 job for unemployed person B with a $10 reservation 
wage.  This in turn led to a $10 job for unemployed person C with a zero reservation wage.  In 
this case, person A’s new reservation wage is $15, a gain of $3.  Person B’s new reservation  
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wage is $12, a gain of $2.  Person C’s new reservation wage is $10, a gain of $10.  Total worker 
benefits are $3 + $2 + $10 = $15.  If there are employer productivity losses, efficiency benefits 
will be less.  
Reservation wages are difficult to measure.  A reasonable assumption is that reservation 
wages will increase at least as much as market wages when labor demand shocks increase wages 
and decrease unemployment.  Theory suggests that when market wages increase, holding 
unemployment constant, the ratio of the increase in reservation wages to the increase in market 
wages will be slightly below one.  (Mortensen [1986, p. 864].  The theoretical ratio of the change 
in reservation wages to the change in market wages is the discount factor of the worker for future 
dollars that are the mean unemployment spell length in the future.)  Reduced unemployment will 
further raise reservation wages.  Furthermore, evidence suggests that unemployment shocks 
increase reservation wages by a similar percentage to market wages.  (Jones [1989] finds an 
elasticity of reservation wages with respect to the unemployment rate of −0.06 to −0.22.  This is 
similar to the market “wage curve” elasticity of Blanchflower and Oswald [1994] of −0.1.)  In 
addition, as noted above, we consistently find, at places and times with different wages, that 
reservation wages are near market wages.  This finding suggests that reservation wages rise close 
to one-for-one with market wages over the long run.   
How do efficiency benefits from a labor demand shock compare to the direct earnings 
effects from the shock?  The adjusted reservation wage gain provides an answer in terms of a 
few parameters.  
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Wr and Wm are the reservation wage and the market wage, holding worker characteristics 
constant.  E is the number of employed.  U is the number of nonemployed. dWr and dWm are the 
changes in reservation wages and market wages.  dE is the shock to employment.  Sre and Sme are 
the elasticities of reservation wages and market wages with respect to the employment shock.  f 
is the proportion of the wage increase that represents a loss to employers. 
  The left-hand-side numerator is the change in reservation wages over both employed and 
nonemployed, adjusted by the loss to employers.  The denominator is the direct earnings effects 
of the labor demand shock.  The right-hand-side of the first equals sign expresses this in terms of 
the elasticity of reservation wages with respect to a labor demand shock.  The right-hand-side of 
the second equals sign expresses this in terms of the elasticity of market wages.  
  The adjusted earnings gain approach to measuring benefits relies on an ex post analysis.  
The policy leads to earnings effects.  The percentage change in earnings will be the sum of the 
percentage changes in wages and employment rates.  (We could add in changes in weekly work 
hours.)  The labor demand increase will increase wages and job availability.  Workers will 
respond by changes in job search behavior, reservation wages, quit rates, etc.  Ex post, we can 
view changes in earnings, wages, and job assignments as fixed.  We can imagine requiring 
workers to make the actual optimal choices they did under both the old and new regimes.  Under 
a no-choice regime, a worker’s reservation wage has no meaning.  The worker’s willingness to 
pay for the policy will be equal to the increased earnings minus the value of the workers’ 
reduced leisure time, adjusted for stigma effects.  An efficiency measure adjusts for employer 
losses. Spillover benefits due to empathy can be added.  
Consider the previous example, of three unemployed workers whose job options changed 
due to one new job at $15.  Total earnings go up by the increased wages of the workers who  
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would have been employed anyway, or $3 plus $2.  Against this must be offset any employer 
loss if upgraded workers are less productive.  There also are gains of $10 for the worker who 
would otherwise have stayed unemployed.  From this must be subtracted the stigma-adjusted 
value of reduced leisure time, which is assumed in this example to be zero.  Then we can choose 
to add in any spillover benefits.  The total efficiency benefit is $15, with possible adjustments for 
employer losses and spillovers.  As the example illustrates, the analysis of earnings gains must 
adjust for the newly employed having lower than average wages. 
The adjusted earnings gains measure can be used to express efficiency benefits in terms 
of a few parameters.  We consider again the ratio of the efficiency benefits from a demand shock 
to a demand shock’s direct earnings effects.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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dY is the change in earnings.  E is employment.  dWm is the change in market wage rates, holding 
worker characteristics constant.  dER is the change in the employment rate, defined with respect 
to the  population.  N is the population. f is the proportion of wage gains offset by employer 
losses.  g is the proportion of earnings gains from new employment that represents a loss of 
valued leisure, given stigma and spillover effects.  h is the proportion by which newly employed 
workers’ wages are less than the average wage.  Sme and Sere are the elasticities of market wages 
and the employment rate with respect to the employment shock.   
  The numerator of the left-hand-side is the change in earnings, adjusted down by employer 
and leisure time losses.  The right-hand-side writes this in terms of elasticities of market wages 
and employment rates.   
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  Equations (1) and (2) are measuring the same benefits.  Therefore, reservation wage 
changes in equation (1) must be compatible with parameter g in equation (2).  Suppose g is close 
to one—lost leisure time is valued at close to the wage rate.  Then for equation (1) to equal 
equation (2), the change in reservation wages must be close to the change in market wages.  This 
is consistent with theories of how reservation wages respond to market wages.  Suppose instead 
that g is close to zero—there are large stigma effects of unemployment.  In that case, for 
equation (1) to equal (2), reservation wages must go up by much more than market wages.  This 
makes sense.  Stigma effects imply a larger value to workers of reducing unemployment, which 
then has larger effects on the reservation wage.      
  For a policy targeting the disadvantaged for increased employment, either adjusted 
reservation wage gains or adjusted earnings gains can be used to measure how this policy affects 
untargeted workers.  The efficiency benefits for the trained workers are probably better evaluated 
separately.  Because these trained workers are targeted, they differ in how the policy affects their 
wages and employment, and in their responses.  In addition, empathy-based spillover benefits 
from increasing employment may be greater for the disadvantaged than for other workers.  For 
measuring benefits for trained workers, one issue is that some trained workers may not have 
worked prior to training.  Without an observed pre-training wage, estimating adjusted reservation 
wage gains is more difficult.  The adjusted earnings gains approach seems an easier way to 
measure benefits for trained workers.  
To carry out these approaches to measuring employment benefits, we can divide the 
analysis into three stages.  First, what is the shock produced by the policy to labor demands 
and/or supplies of different types?  Second, what are the effects of the policy on wages, 
unemployment, and other labor market outcomes?  Third, effects on wages and employment  
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rates, along with some parameter assumptions, can be used to compute the adjusted reservation 
wage and earnings measures.  
Depending upon whether we want a national or local perspective, we can apply this 
approach to either national or local labor markets.  We might also want a national perspective on 
the effects of shocks to local labor markets.  To do so, we can use a local labor market model to 
analyze effects in the targeted local market, but then also consider effects in nonlocal markets.  
For example, an economic development strategy that attracts jobs to one state may be offset by 
reduced jobs in other states.  (In a recent study, about 80 percent of the employment increases for 
one state due to its incentives are offset by employment decreases in other states [Bartik 2011a, 
Chapter 10].)  In addition, a labor demand shock to one local labor market will attract labor 
supply from other local markets.  Under some models, the reduction in consumption and housing 
demand in these other local markets will roughly offset their reduced labor supply.  (For 
example, migration yields similar percentage effects on employment [Muth 1971; Greenwood 
and Hunt 1984].)  However, effects of drawing labor supply from other labor markets may 
depend on the types of labor supply attracted and housing conditions in these markets.  
The shock to employment of the policy should include any Keynesian or input-output 
multiplier effects.  Agglomeration economy effects should be considered.  Due to agglomeration 
economies, increased employment in some businesses may spill over into higher productivity 
and growth for other businesses in the same or related industries.  The shock should also reflect 
substitution effects.  For example, suppose some economic development policy in a local area 
subsidizes a business that largely sells its products to local consumers.  A sports stadium is a 
good example.  Most of the increased labor demand directly tied to the project will be offset by 
reduced sales and labor demand at other businesses selling to local consumers.  Such substitution  
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effects justify the conventional wisdom that local development should target “export-base” 
businesses.  (Export-base businesses sell their product outside the local area.)  
The employment effects of a policy should include the policy’s financing.  If labor 
markets do not clear, effects on employment in other labor markets may have efficiency effects.  
Effects of tax or deficit financing are available from many regional or national econometric 
models.  In a simple model of tax financing, the negative employment effects of increased taxes 
will roughly offset multiplier effects due to respending.  In other words, the balanced budget 
multiplier may be close to one (Orszag and Stiglitz 2001; Bartik and Erickcek 2003).  Under this 
simplifying assumption, we can consider project direct effects without household respending.  
From this analysis, we estimate some vector of shocks caused by the policy to labor 
demand or supply of various types in one or more local markets.  We then use some model to 
determine the effects of these demand and supply shocks on labor market outcomes.  These labor 
market models may be reduced form models.  At the local level, there are estimates of how 
unemployment, labor force participation, and wages respond to shocks (Bartik 1991).  If the 
unemployment response is known, there are models for how wages respond to unemployment 
(Blanchflower and Oswald 1994), and how labor force participation responds to unemployment 
(Bowen and Finegan 1969; Gordon 2010).  These labor market models may be structural, such as 
general equilibrium models.  Models may also be some hybrids of structural and reduced form 
models. Such hybrid models include most large-scale macroeconometric models and regional 
econometric models (Treyz 1993).  Another type of hybrid model is an efficiency wage model, 
that combines a wage curve relating wages to unemployment, with labor supply and labor 
demand equations (Bartik 2001, Appendix 1; 2011b).   
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At the national level, the modeling needs to consider the government’s response to 
changes in wages and unemployment.  (Ideally this should also be done locally, but such local 
responses are less important.)  How the Federal Reserve responds to changes in unemployment is 
a key issue.  At an extreme, suppose Fed policy in some economic situation was to keep national 
unemployment from responding to some policy that shocks some employment.  Such a Fed 
response would significantly reduce the national employment benefits of the policy.   
The labor market outcomes due to the policy will be used as inputs to the adjusted 
reservation wage gain model or adjusted earnings gain model.  Larger labor market responses 
mean larger policy-induced employment benefits (or costs, if outcomes change negatively).  The 
size of the adjusted reservation wage gain depends upon the wage response.  In wage curve 
models, wage responses will be larger if the unemployment response is larger.  Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1994) argue that the elasticity of the wage with respect to the unemployment rate is 
about −0.1.  The size of the adjusted earnings gain measure will depend upon responses of 
wages, unemployment, and labor force participation.  In many reduced form models, the change 
in unemployment will be a driver for changes in labor force participation rates and work hours.  
Okun’s Law as well as other empirical research finds that a 1 percent lower unemployment rate 
will increase labor force participation rates by about one-half of 1 percent, and weekly work 
hours by about one-half of 1 percent (Bowen and Finegan 1969; Gordon 2010).  Therefore, the 
size of employment benefits of policies depends on the size of unemployment effects of labor 
demand or supply shocks.  Unemployment effects will vary in different economic conditions.  
Under extreme assumptions, even sizable labor demand shocks will cause no changes in 
unemployment or other labor market outcomes.  As a result, these demand shocks will have no 
employment benefits.  For example, consider the extreme case in Harberger (1971) and Harris  
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and Todaro (1970).  The urban sector has involuntary unemployment, but there is a large market-
clearing rural labor market, with perfect mobility between labor markets.  Under these 
assumptions, shocks to urban labor demand will cause enough mobility that there are no effects 
on unemployment and wages.  The adjusted reservation wage and earnings gains measures will 
properly measure zero employment benefits.  But is this extreme model close to the truth?  Is it 
true that a labor demand shock in an urban labor market with involuntary unemployment will not 
affect unemployment and wages?  
Effects on unemployment and other labor market outcomes may be greater at high 
unemployment than at low unemployment.  If so, labor demand shocks will have greater 
employment benefits when unemployment is high.  Labor supply shocks may cause larger losses 
of employment benefits when unemployment is high.  At the local level, when unemployment is 
low, we would expect increased labor demand to have less of a labor pool to draw on.  The result 
is less effects on unemployment, and more effects on in-migration.  Empirical estimates suggest 
that this is the case.  For example, Bartik’s (1991, p. 100) estimates suggest that a 1 percent 
shock to local labor demand might lower unemployment rates by 0.46 percent in a depressed 
local economy versus 0.14 percent in a booming local economy.  At the national level, if the 
economy is close to full employment, the Federal Reserve will be more aggressive in offsetting 
any policy that boosts labor demand.  
The unemployment effects of job creation policies may be increased by targeting hiring 
on the unemployed.  Labor demand policies sometimes include such targeting.  For example, 
some wage subsidies for employers, such as Minnesota’s MEED program, require subsidies to 
be used for hiring the unemployed (Bartik 2001, pp. 216–17).  Some economic development  
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incentives have “first source” requirements, under which assisted businesses are required to 
consider referrals from the local workforce system (Bartik 2001, pp. 256–258).  
What is the potential impact of such targeting on the unemployed?  Using Persky et al.’s 
(2004) empirical data on local job chains, the unemployed directly fill 13 percent of new jobs 
created.  However, ultimately jobs that are filled by hiring the employed lead to vacancies that 
are filled by others.  As the job chain proceeds, ultimately all newly created jobs must lead to 
increased employment for the unemployed, those out of the labor force, or in-migrants.  Persky 
et al.’s job chain estimates indicate that ultimately, about 34 percent of all newly created jobs 
lead to hiring the unemployed.  
Suppose we revise the Persky et al. (2004) job chain matrices by doubling the proportion 
of each job type that is filled by hiring the unemployed.  We offset this doubling by 
proportionately reducing the probabilities of filling the job in other ways.  This policy only 
increases the percent of the unemployed who are directly hired for new jobs from 13 percent to 
26 percent.  But the ultimate share of all new jobs that increase the employment of the 
unemployed goes up from 34 percent to 54 percent.  
To achieve this large increase, however, requires that all job vacancies must be filled in a 
way that targets the unemployed.  This requires a change in all employers’ hiring practices, not 
just the employers who created the new jobs.  For example, perhaps such broad changes in 
employer practices could be encouraged by improving workforce programs that assist the 
unemployed.  
The downward adjustments to reservation wage and earnings gains are greater when 
unemployment is lower.  First, as mentioned above, reduced productivity due to occupational 
upgrading is more of a problem when unemployment is low.  When unemployment is low, some  
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workers will be promoted to jobs well beyond their previous work experience.  When 
unemployment is high, a labor demand shock will be more likely to move up workers to jobs that 
are not too far outside their established work skills.  
Second, the value of the unemployed’s leisure time, adjusted for stigma effects, will be 
higher when unemployment is low.  In a low unemployment economy, those with very low 
values of leisure time relative to their wage would be more likely to already have found a job.  In 
addition, the empathy-based spillover benefits of reducing unemployment may be lower when 
unemployment is already low.  The average person may perceive lower burdens of 
unemployment when jobs are readily found.   
As an example of measuring employment benefits, consider a local labor demand shock.  
We ignore national effects, either because they are not being counted or because they are small.  
Let us look at some short-run employment benefits as a percentage of the employment shock.  
Bartik (1991) estimates an occupational wage upgrading elasticity of 0.24.  Short-run elasticities 
of employment to labor force ratios might be as high as 0.51 if local unemployment is high, and 
as low as 0.15 if local unemployment is low  (Bartik [1991], p. 100.  I assume the U.S. 2010 
unemployment rate of 9.6 percent to calculate the high unemployment elasticity, the 2007 
unemployment rate of 4.6 percent to calculate the low unemployment elasticity.)  Short-run 
elasticities of labor force participation rates appear to be the same at low and high 
unemployment, at about 0.16 (Bartik 1991, p. 166).  Persky et al.’s (2004) results for the newly 
employed suggest their wages will be about 30 percent below the average wages of new jobs 
created.  (Author’s calculations based on Persky et al.’s matrices.)   
Assume that when local unemployment rates are high, parameters f and g, the employer 
loss and leisure loss parameters, are close to zero.  In that case, the adjusted reservation wage  
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measure says that local employment benefits are at least 24 percent of direct earnings effects of 
the shock.  Employment benefits will probably be much greater than 24 percent given that local 
reservation wages will probably increase faster than local market wages.  The adjusted earnings 
gain measure says that when local unemployment rates are high, local employment benefits 
might be as great as 70 percent of the direct earnings effect of the labor demand shock [70 
percent = 24 percent + (1 − 30 percent )(51 percent + 16 percent )].  If the policy has multiplier 
effects, these employment benefits could exceed the payroll costs of direct hires.  On the other 
hand, suppose local unemployment is low, and therefore both f and g are close to one.  In that 
case, both efficiency benefit measures will be close to zero even if the wage and employment 
rate adjustments are high.   
Consider the implications of this analysis for the national benefits of demand shocks to 
one local area.  Suppose the area that gets the extra jobs has high unemployment.  Suppose that 
overall national unemployment rates are very low.  Under these assumptions, spillover effects on 
other areas can be ignored.  The labor market gains or losses for other areas due to taking jobs or 
workers away from those low unemployment areas will be small.    
 
Conclusion 
There may be considerable efficiency gains from increased employment in labor markets 
with involuntary unemployment.  Theory, empirical evidence, and intuition all suggest that 
employment benefits from job creation may be greater if unemployment rates are high.  
The challenge for benefit-cost analysis is how to measure such benefits. The literature 
offers diverse approaches that are often difficult to carry out or rely on arbitrary assumptions.   
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This review offers some alternatives that express employment benefits in terms of empirically 
measurable parameters. 
Measurement of employment benefits would be improved by better estimates of how 
labor market outcomes respond to demand and supply shocks.  But perhaps the most pressing 
needs are twofold.  First, we need better estimates of how reservation wages respond to labor 
demand shocks under different labor market conditions.  Second, we need some estimates of how 
employer profits respond to the occupational upgrading brought about by labor demand shocks.  
With better estimates of reservation wage and profit responses, the adjusted reservation wage 
measure could be better estimated.  Improvements to the adjusted reservation wage measure 
seem easier than for the adjusted earnings measure.  The adjusted earnings measure depends on 
subjective values of involuntary leisure due to unemployment. 
Even if we improve estimates of efficiency benefits of labor demand increases, a full 
social accounting always depends on value judgments.  This paper has focused on efficiency 
benefits.  However, distributional effects are important.  Labor demand shocks or supply shocks 
will often involve redistribution between workers and employers.  Such redistribution will often 
be large compared to the policy’s costs.  Policy analysts must decide how to consider such 
redistributional effects, as well as efficiency benefits, in evaluating policies that affect 
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